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ZONING-- TY-WDE -BAN ON BmLBOARDS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
EXCEEDS ZONING POWERS OF A MUNIcrPALITY. Combined Communi-
cations Corp. v. City & County of Denver, - Colo. -, 542 P.2d 79
(1975).
In 1971, the city and county of Denver enacted the Denver Sign
Code;1 a set of seven ordinances designed to eliminate all outdoor
billboards within the city over a five year period. Plaintiff, owner of an
outdoor advertising business, challenged .the validity of two of the
ordinances 2 and the district court upheld the claim,3 permanently en-
joining enforcement of the ordinances. 4 In Combined Communica-
tions Corp. v. City & County of Denver,5 the Colorado Supreme Court
affirmed the district court decision, holding the city was not empowered
by its police or zoning power to enact ordinances prohibiting an entire
industry from operating anywhere within the city.
The question faced by the Colorado Supreme Court is being con-
sidered for the first time by a number of jurisdictions 6-- can a major city
undertake a beautification campaign that calls for a city-wide ban on all
off-premises advertising devices? Courts that have considered the issue
have reached opposite conclusions. The traditional rule is that a city
cannot enforce a zoning ordinance based solely on aesthetic considera-
tions.7 Jurisdictions adhering to this rule require that sign control
1. DENVER, COLO., REV. MUN. CODE § 617 (1971).
2. Id., Ordinances No. 94 & 95.
3. Combined Communications Corp. v. City & County of Denver, - Colo. -, 542
P.2d 79 (1975).
4. The district court decision came on remand from a prior appeal, 186 Colo. 443,
528 P.2d 249 (1974). In that proceeding, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed the
district court's decision to issue a preliminary injunction restraining the city from enforc-
ing the ordinances until a hearing on the merits. The court denied the injunctive relief
on two bases: first, that a preliminary injunction should not be enforced when less than
two months remained until trial on the merits and, secondly, that plaintiffs had pur-
chased their business with knowledge of the ordinances and then delayed twenty-one
months before commencing an action.
5. - Colo. -, 542 P.2d 79 (1975).
6. Numerous cities and counties in California have undertaken varied forms of sign
regulation. For an overview of the California response to scenic pollution see Note,
State and Local Billboard Control in California, 11 CAL. W.L. REv. 193 (1974).
7. The traditional view-which has been, and to great measure still is, fol-
lowed in most states-is that restrictions on the use of property cannot validly
be based solely on aesthetic considerations, such considerations in themselves
not being a proper object of the police power, but that ordinances which serve
other zoning purposes will be upheld even though an aesthetic purpose is present
as well.
A. RATHKOPF, THE LAw oF ZoNiNG iN PLANNING § 14.01, at 14-1 (4th ed. 1975)
(footnote omitted).
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ordinances bear a substantial relationship to public health, safety, mor-
als or welfare to be valid as an exercise of the city's police power s A
growing number of jurisdictions, however, are following the rule an-
nounced in Berman v. Parker.' Under this doctrine, aesthetically moti-
vated sign control ordinances are not necessarily invalid simply because
they are unrelated to the normal police power objectives.10 The majori-
ty opinion of the Colorado Supreme Court appears to side with the
traditional view of legitimate police power objectives in holding that
Denver's ordinances unconstitutionally exceeded the city's zoning au-
thority.
The two ordinances at the heart of the controversy were broadly
structured to eliminate all off-premises billboards." Ordinance No. 94
repealed sections of the Denver zoning ordinance that permitted a "use
by right" to outdoor advertising devices in certain zoned districts, there-
by preventing the erection of any new billboards within the city. Ordi-
8. Early cases laying the foundation for invalidating billboard control ordinances
on aesthetic grounds alone include Varney & Green v. Williams, 155 Cal. 318, 100 P.
867 (1909); Curran Co. v. Denver, 47 Colo. 221, 107 P. 261 (1910); Chicago v. Gun-
ning Sys., 214 Ill. 628, 73 N.E. 1035 (1905); Crawford v. Topeka, 51 Kan. 756, 33
P. 776 (1893); Bill Pasting Sign Co. v. Atlantic City, 71 N.J.L. 72, 58 A. 342 (1904).
Modem courts following this view include In re Appeal of Ammon R. Smith Auto Co.,
423 Pa. 493, 223 A.2d 683 (1966); Norate Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 417 Pa.
397, 207 A.2d 890 (1965).
9. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). Justice Douglas, speaking for the United States Supreme
Court, expanded the traditional application of the police power to municipal affairs to
include aesthetic considerations:
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. . . . The values it
represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is
within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should
be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well
as carefully patrolled.
Id. at 33 (citation omitted).
10. Decisions following the modem doctrine of accepting aesthetic considerations
as, at least in part, a valid basis for sign control ordinances include E.B. Elliot Advertis-
ing Co. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 425 F.2d 1141 (5th Cir. 1970); State v. Diamond
Motors, Inc., 50 Hawaii 33, 429 P.2d 825 (1967); Jasper v. Commonwealth, 375 S.W.2d
709 (Ky. 1964); Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 225 N.E.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d
22 (1967); Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Ore. 35, 400 P.2d 255 (1965).
11. Off-premises signs are those relating to products, services or uses not found on
the same zone lot as the signs. Unaffected by the Denver ordinances were advertising
devices, displays, and signs on a business' own premises used to attract attention to its
services or products. Ordinance No. 90 expressly exempted from its "off-premises sign"
classification
(1) [fjlags of nations or an organization of nations, states and cities, fraternal,
religious and civic organizations; (2) merchandise, pictures or models of prod-
ucts or services incorporated in a window display; (3) time and temperature
devices not related to a product; (4) national, state, religious, fraternal, profes-
sional and civic symbols or crests; (5) works of art which in no way identify
a product. If for any reason it cannot be readily determined whether or not an
object is a sign, the Department of Zoning Administration shall make such de-
termination,
2
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nance No. 95 required the removal of all existing outdoor signs over a
five year period in accordance with an amortization schedule.' 2
While the lower court struck down the two ordinances on a number
of grounds, 3 the supreme court predicated its decision on only two of
those holdings; (1) that Ordinance No. 94 was an ultra vires act because
it exceeded the grant of authority to the Denver City Council by the
city's charter, and (2) that if Ordinance No. 94 failed, No. 95 would
fall along with it. 4 The court then held that whether the city relied on
its police power or its zoning powers' 5 to justify the ordinances, the test
for validity under either course was the standard of reasonableness.' 0
12. Amortization involves the elimination of nonconforming uses, without payment
of compensation, by allowing a reasonable period of time over which the value of the
nonconforming use is amortized. With sign amortization, for instance, a city may exer-
nise its zoning authority to require all signs in a given district be removed within a desig-
nated period of time. If the period is reasonable, the value of each sign is amortized
by its owner over the period and he writes off his losses as income tax expenses when
the period expires. For an analysis of what constitutes a reasonable amortization period
see Art Neon Co. v. City & County of Denver, 357 F. Supp. 466 (D. Colo. 1973), hold-
ing a five year period to be reasonable.
13. The district court found that Ordinance 94 was an ultra vires act, that the defi-
nitions of "outdoor general advertising device" and "sign" contained in the ordinance
unconstitutionally delegated legislative authority to the Zoning Administrator, that Ordi-
nances 94 and 95 constituted a taking of property without just compensation violative
of the fifth amendment, that Ordinance 95 violated state law on a matter of state-wide
concern and that Ordinances 94 and 95 violated the plaintiff's freedom of speech. -
Colo. at -, 542 P.2d at 81.
14. The supreme court found Ordinance 95 so "intertwined" with Ordinance 94 that,
as written, it would become inoperative should 94 fail. If the city did not possess the
power to prevent the erection of new billboards within the city, it follows that it was
not empowered to require the demolition of existing signs.
15. Police power is the inherent power which lies within the state and which
enables the legislature to enact laws regulating or prohibiting anything harm-
ful to the welfare-of the people.
Municipalities, as such, have no police power. The residual police power
reposes in the state and not in any of its political subdivisions. A municipality
can only exercise police power when it has specifically or impliedly received a
delegation of such power from the state. And it can only exercise such power
as has been delegated to the extent, and in the manner, delegated.
The authority to enact zoning ordinances, the matters which may be regu-
lated thereunder, and the manner in which they may be enacted or amended,
must be specifically delegated to municipalities for them to exercise the power
to zone.
The delegation of power to zone is found in the zoning enabling acts of
the various states ....
A. RATHKoPF, THm LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 2.01, at 2-2, 2-7 to 2-9 (4th ed.
1975).
16. In Art Neon Co. v. City & County of Denver, 488 F.2d 118, 122 (10th Cir.
1973), the Tenth Circuit noted some of the factors commonly considered by courts in
applying the test of reasonableness:
These include the nature of the nonconforming use, the character of the struc-
ture, the location, what part of the individual's total business is concerned, the
3
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Under this standard, the ordinance in question must bear a reasonable
relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose," usually judicially inter-
preted to mean the ordinance must conform to serving one or more of
the traditional police power objectives of public health, safety, morals or
welfare.18
In applying the reasonableness standard to the Denver ordinances,
the majority opinion confined its analysis to the effect the ordinances
would have on the outdoor advertising business in the city, and rejected
the city's argument that the billboard industry was only one segment of
the advertising business and not a separate industry. 9 Since the ordi-
nances would unquestionably prohibit the erection or maintenance of
any billboards in the city, the court found that enforcement would
restrain the operation of the entire outdoor advertising industry in
Denver. Under the court's limitation of police power a city-wide prohi-
bition of a distinct and separate industry is valid only if the entire
industry constitutes a public nuisance.20 The court made clear that it
did not consider outdoor signs to be inherently a public nuisance.
Since the outdoor advertising industry is a separate and
distinct industry, the effect of Ordinance 94 is -to completely
prohibit the improvement and extension of that industry in
the entire city. Under ,a concept of reasonableness, the char-
ter authorization of regulation does not permit Denver under
its zoning power to prohibit this entire industry....
S. . [The power to regulatd does not include "any
power, . . .express or inherent, to prohibit."'
time periods, salvage, depreciation for income tax purposes, and depreciation
for other purposes, and the monopoly or advantage, if any, resulting from the
fact that similar new structures are prohibited in the same area. Where signs
are concerned, the courts usually also mention the fact that the use is also of
public streets since the message is directed to the passerby.
17. Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.
502 (1933); Markham Advertising Co. v. State, 73 Wash. 2d 405, 439 P.2d 248 (1968).
18. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). But see City of Escondido v. Desert
Advertising, Inc., 8 Cal. 3d 785, 505 P.2d 1012, 106 Cal. Rptr. 172, cert. denied, 414
U.S. 828 (1973).
19. The argument that on-premises business identification signs and off-premises
billboards are merely facets of the same industry has been largely discredited. United
Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Raritan, 11 N.J. 144, 150, 93 A.2d 363, 365 (1952).
See also Markham Advertising Co. v. State, 73 Wash. 2d 405, 439 P.2d 248 (1968).
20. The Colorado Supreme Court furnished no basis for its conclusion that outdoor
signs were not a public nuisance. It seems, however, that the court used a very narrow
construction of the term "public nuisance" to reach the result it desired. While courts
have been reluctant to classify billboards a nuisance simply because they are unsightly,
they have, under a nuisance theory, upheld bans on the basis that such signs posed a
threat to traffic safety. Markham Advertising Co. v. State, 73 Wash. 2d 405, 439 P.2d
248 (1968). See also Annot., 38 A.L.R.3d 647 (1971).
21. 542 P.2d at 82-83 (citation omitted).
19761
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The dissenting opinion argued that while the majority correctly
decided the applicable test was one of reasonableness, the court failed to
properly apply the test to the Denver ordinances. The real issue,
according to the dissent, was "[w]hether the City in the reasonable
exercise of its police power may prohibit the erection of new off-
premises, outdoor billboards. '22  A city's authority to act under its
police power is dependent upon whether the action taken is not arbitrary
or unreasonable and bears a substantial relationship to public health,
safety, morals and general welfare.23 Thus, a determination of the
reasonableness of the Denver ordinances required not only an analysis of
the effect of the restrictions on the billboard industry (to which the
majority had limited its inquiry), but also an examination of the desired
impact of the ordinances on the city. Following the extended reasoning
of the dissent, the proper test of reasonableness is a balancing of the
competing interests. The city's interest in promoting aesthetic values
must be measured against the economic interests of the outdoor advertis-
ing industry.2 4
The majority holding in Combined Communications confirms the
suspicion shared by many commentators25 that courts will largely be
unreceptive to city-wide bans on off-premises signs in major municipali-
ities, regardless of the motivation behind the ordinances. Although
courts have upheld ordinances similar to those invalidated here, the
towns have tended to be small and without large central business
districts.2" A notable exception, though unchallenged in the courts, is a
zoning ordinance recently enacted by the city of San Diego, 27 which
resembles the Denver ordinance and is designed to enhance the city's
appearance by eliminating all off-premises advertising devices. Present-
ly, San Diego is the only major metropolitan city with an ordinance
completely prohibiting billboards.
A number of jurisdictions have ordinances limiting billboards to
22. Id. at 83 (Kelley, J., dissenting).
23. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
24. The dissent expressed no opinion on the outcome of the case, noting only that
it would remand the matter to the district court for determination under the balancing
test.
25. See C. CRAWFORD, HANDBooK OF ZONING AND LAND USE ORDINANCES 86-97
(1974); D. MANDELxER, MANAGING OuR URBAN ENVIRONMENT 737-47 (1963); F. WI.-
LrAMS, THE LAw oF Crrv PLANNING AND ZONING 392-93 (1922); N. WILLIAMS, JR., THE
STRucTuRE OF URBAN ZONING 90-91 (1966).
26. United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Metuchen, 42 N.J. 1, 198 A.2d 447
(1964); Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 225 N.E.2d 749,279 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967).
27. SAN DIEGO, CAL., CODE § 101.700 et seq. (1972).
[Vol. I11
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certain districts within a city. In Schloss v. Jamison,28 the North
Carolina Supreme Court upheld an ordinance prohibiting the erection of
billboards in downtown Charlotte, the state's largest city. The court
found the city's purpose in enacting the ordinance, to create a "first-class
business and commercial district," was neither arbitrary nor discrimina-
tory.2
9
Oklahoma courts have not confronted the task of determining the
validity of a city-wide off-premises sign control ordinance. The poten-
tial for such a suit exists. Sign regulation is within the police power of
the state of Oklahoma. 0 This regulatory authority is delegated by
statutes' to municipalities. As a result, any city within the state can
pursuant to its police power enact zoning ordinances regulating the
erection and maintenance of billboard signs.
The problem of environmental deterioration in core cities necessi-
tates allowing governing bodies to consider aesthetic values; otherwise
cities will not be able to cope with situations similar to those faced by
Denver.3 2  The Colorado Supreme Court's blanket rejection of uni-
lateral sign control, ignores the complex problem of visual pollution. As
a result, the cities are left with little, if any, effective means of eliminat-
ing or controlling the problem of visual pollution caused by the contin-
ued use of billboard signs.
While a complete prohibition of off-premises billboards, motivated
solely by aesthetic considerations, may be neither valid nor desirable,
prohibitory measures should be more seriously scrutinized when based
on other considerations. 33 As the dissent in Combined Communications
advocates, only when all the public considerations behind such an
28. 262 N.C. 108, 136 S.E.2d 691 (1964).
29. Obviously, the legislative intent was to establish a first-class business and
commercial district in the heart of the downtown area. In our view, it was
permissible for the City Council to determine that the accomplishment of this
purpose would serve the entire city. . .. Moreover, we think it was permis-
sible for the City Council to determine that it would be advantageous to the
owners and occupants of property [within the district] and would enhance its
status as a first-class business and commercial district to limit advertising signs
within the district to those defined in the ordinance as business signs.
Id. at -, 136 S.E.2d at 697.
30. Gibbons v. Missouri, K.&T. Ry., 142 Okla. 146, 285 P. 1040 (1930).
31. OsLA. STAT. tit. 11, § 401 (1971) provides in pertinent part:
For the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals, or the general welfare of
the community, the legislative body of cities and incorporated villages is hereby
empowered to regulate and restrict. . . structures and land for trade, industry,
residence or other purposes.
32. 542 P.2d at 83-84 (Kelley, J., dissenting).
33. For example, the city of Denver not only claimed the billboards were a source
of visual pollution, but also argued that they posed a hazard to driving safety.
1976]
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ordinance are balanced against the harm to the affected economic
interests can the reasonableness of sign control ordinances be ascer-
tained. By refusing to entertain the question, the Colorado Supreme
Court can only delay, not preclude, consideration of a city's authority to
initiate aesthetic zoning. Unfortunately, for Denver and other cities in
Colorado, this delay may prove fatal.
Ben Singletary
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